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The Iran nuclear deal with E3+3 and 
P5+1 is not without its detractors. The 
Iranian Conservative Party, the US 
Republican Party and Israel disapprove. 
This policy brief aims to understand the 
Iranian and US domestic factors that 
could challenge the implementation of 
the deal. The 15-year implementation 
process is likely to be affected by the 
state-centric Constitution of Iran, which 
leaves no room for foreign and, in 
particular, Western considerations, and 
by US Republican fears relating to the 
security of the state of Israel. Other 
objections come from Arab Sunni States 
as well as US Democrats also concerned 
about Israeli security. 
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„the development of relations and cooperation 
with Iran based on mutual respect and the 
establishment of international confidence in 
the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran‟s 
nuclear programme.‟  
The E3+3 and P5+1 deal ensures that the 
Iranian nuclear programme is developed for 
civilian and non-military purposes by asking 
Iran to cease its uranium and plutonium 
enrichment, and to authorize inspections and 
checks carried out by nuclear experts from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
on nuclear sites. The E3+3 and P5+1 deal 
maintains an arms embargo in order to 
prevent the spread of offensive weapons and 
the transfer of ballistic missiles to Iran. These 
duties are accompanied by incentives. Iran 
obtained the lifting of US and EU economic 
sanctions on the Implementation Day, 16 
January 2016.  
However, the Iranian Conservative Party, the 
US Republican Party and Israel disapprove of 
the deal. The deal‟s detractors reproached the 
negotiating team for conceding too much in 
order to safeguard the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) at all costs before the end of 
their political mandates. But the process of 
negotiations with Iran must be carried out in 
the long term and cannot be accelerated by a 
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The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) agreed in Vienna on 14 July 2015 
between the E3+3 and P5+11 and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, should be considered the 
crowning achievement of a 12-year process of 
diplomatic negotiation. This agreement aims to 
resolve the international security crisis posed 
by the clandestine and unidentified nature of 
the Iranian nuclear activities first noticed in 
2003. United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) decision 1696 has called for such an 
agreement since 2006 in order to encourage 
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desire to gain plaudits in the short term. In the 
light of this, five main Iranian and US 
domestic factors would put the 
implementation of the deal at risk. 
The E3+3 must remain vigilant as well as 
active and at the forefront of the international 
community regarding the effective 
implementation of the Iran nuclear deal‟s 
provisions.   
FACTOR 1: IRANIAN NATIONAL 
POLITICAL CULTURE. 
The first factor is related to the national 
political culture in Iran. Article 152 of the 
Constitution includes three of the five Iranian 
Foreign Policy principles that may be applied 
to the nuclear negotiations, namely (1) the 
„rejection of all forms of domination, both the 
exertion of it and submission to it,‟ (2) the 
„preservation of the independence of the 
country in all respects and its territorial 
integrity,‟ (3) and the „non-alignment with 
respect to the hegemonic superpowers.‟ Article 
152 expressly ordains that Iran must only 
pursue its aspirations when it is not restrained 
by a foreign power. 
Strict compliance with the Iranian 
Constitution was once a major obstacle to the 
achievement of nuclear negotiations, but was 
circumvented under the influence of Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei, Iran‟s supreme leader. If such a 
move is in the strategic interest of the country 
– meaning that isolation from the West is 
beneficial – Article 152 might be brought back 
to prominence. The three words „rejection‟, 
„preservation‟ and „non-alignment‟ reflect the 
foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran‟s 
ideology and define Iran‟s intransigence 
towards all third states, and particularly 
Western states. They reflect the Iranian will to 
protect its state, suffering no impediment 
posed by Western considerations that seek to 
thwart Iran‟s nuclear and regional aspirations.  
 The Iranian Constitution is strictly applied by 
the Iranian Conservative political faction, 
which refuses to interact with Western views, 
believing that they intend to dictate its 
domestic policy. During the 14-year 
presidential term of President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, diplomatic negotiations 
stagnated as the Iranian president accordingly 
and strictly conformed his policy to Iran's 1979 
Constitution. One of the main points of his 
presidential campaign programme was to 
refuse any considerations from Western 
viewpoints that were incompatible with the 
republic‟s Constitution. The presidential 
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad happened 
in August 2005 after the 2003 Tehran 
Declaration, the 2004 Paris Agreement and the 
2005 Brussels negotiations agreed with the 
EU3+12 under the „reformist era‟3 of President 
Mohammad Khatami. Iran accepted the 
implementation of the Additional Protocol of 
the IAEA. The Iranian Conservative Party 
contested the concessions offered to the West 
by the Iranian delegation led by Hassan 
Rouhani, Secretary of the Supreme National 
Security Council, because the EU3+1 offered 
little to its Iranian counterparts.  
This fact strongly contributed to the election in 
August 2005 of the conservative President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was also elected 
for his programme of social and economic 
reforms, which promised a better distribution 
of wealth. The Conservative Party intended to 
openly carry out its uranium enrichment and 
plutonium production during President 
Ahmadinejad‟s terms in office – against the 
wishes of the international community. Its 
views are opposed to those of the moderate or 
pragmatic Iranian political parties which 
favoured an open policy towards the West in 
the hope of a cessation of the economic 
sanctions. 
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FACTOR 2: THE SHADOW OF THE 
IRANIAN CONSERVATIVE 
POLITICAL PARTY. 
The second factor lies in the dichotomy 
between the goals of the Iranian Conservative 
Party, recently embodied by President 
Ahmadinejad‟s terms in office, and those of 
the moderate Iranian political party, currently 
illustrated by President Rouhani‟s term in 
office. On the one hand, President Khatami 
(1997–2005) and President Rouhani‟s terms in 
office (2013–) were characterized by an 
opening up of Iran to Western political 
considerations with the Tehran Declaration in 
2003 and the 14 July 2015 Agreement. On the 
other hand, President Ahmadinejad‟s terms in 
office were characterized by conformity with 
Article 152 of the Constitution in the country‟s 
dealings with the E3+3. The conservative 
political faction seeks to undermine the Iranian 
moderate political party‟s legitimacy and is 
therefore determined in its opposition and 
efforts to prove that the other parties to the 
2015 Agreement won‟t respect Rouhani‟s 
engagement. 
This Iranian dissatisfaction already reared its 
head on 17 January 2016, a day after the 
sanctions were officially lifted on the 
Implementation Day. The US Department of 
the Treasury announced that „The US 
Department of the Treasury‟s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today 
designated 11 entities and individuals involved 
in procurement on behalf of Iran‟s ballistic 
missile program.‟4  The United States 
unilaterally imposed new economic sanctions 
targeting 11 individuals and entities based in 
the United Arab Emirates and China who were 
suspected of having provided assistance to 
Iran's ballistic missile programme via a 
network of shell companies. Iran maintained 
that „Iran's missile program was never designed 
to be able of carrying nuclear weapons. As 
previously announced, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran continues to supervise the implementation 
of the US action plan and responds with 
determination to such propaganda by 
accelerating its ballistic missile program and 
increasing its defence capabilities.‟5  
His Excellency Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
explained on 15 February 2016 at Egmont that 
„Iran is not a monolith, there are a variety of 
views that are represented in Iran. […] In the 
past thirty-seven years, since the Revolution, 
Iran has elected its Presidents and its 
Parliaments and each President has presided 
over the election of his opposition to office. 
You don‟t see that elsewhere in the region. 
President Rafsanjani elected President Khatami 
who at the time of his election was considered 
Rafsanjani‟s opposition as we saw in the next 
parliamentary elections when Rafsanjani was 
side right. President Khatami elected President 
Ahmadinejad who nobody doubts was his 
opposition and President Ahmadinejad elected 
President Rouhani. Again, nobody doubts that 
President Rouhani was the farthest away 
candidate from President Ahmadinejad you 
could find among the six candidates running 
for office.‟6 This transition from a conservative 
to a moderate party opened a breach in Iranian 
intransigence through which the E3+3 rushed 
to get Iran to comply with the international 
responsibilities in the NPT. 
The executive power and the legislative power 
are chaired alternately by the two parties. The 
likelihood of the Conservative Party‟s return to 
power during the 15-year implementation 
phases of the nuclear deal is real. One sign 
leads observers to understand that the 
Conservative Party might be returned to power 
in the next parliamentary elections: hardliner 
Ali Larijani has been appointed chairman of 
the Parliament of Iran. Larijani was the 
secretary of the Supreme National Security 
Council from 15 August 2005 to 20 October 
2007, having been appointed to the position by 
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President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But one 
should bear in mind that the supreme leader of 
Iran has a strong influence over the executive 
power and the legislative power of the country 
and has the final say about any shift in foreign 
policy and national security. Ali Khamenei has 
held the position since Khomeini's death in June 
1989 and has been in power during both the 
negotiation process and the apparent internal 
political changes in Iran.  
If there is dissatisfaction with the economic 
results of the implementation of the agreement, 
he may help bring about the return of the 
Conservative Party. 
Ali Khamenei‟s succession is, however, publicly 
linked to elections for the Assembly of Experts, 
the constitutional body that appoints the 
supreme leader. The Assembly is examining 
potential candidates for the post. Hardliner 
Hassan Khomeini, a grandson of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, has considerable legitimacy 
and is likely to succeed Ali Khamenei. Another 
candidate, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, is 
now a member of the Expediency Discernment 
Council. He is also a member of the Guardian 
Council and the Assembly of Exerts. Somewhat 
distanced from the hardliners, he may have a 
more moderate approach to both domestic 
issues and foreign policy than Khamenei. 
Moderate former president Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani is trying to modify the composition 
of the Assembly of Experts but is not likely to 
win the succession.  
FACTOR 3: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
IMPOSED BY THE UN, EU AND USA 
(2006–2015) LED TO SHARP 
CONTRACTIONS IN IRANIAN 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND A RETURN 
TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.  
Economic sanctions were universally adopted by 
the UNSC from 2006 to 2015, autonomously 
adopted at a state level by the United States 
from 2011 to 2015, and at a regional level by 
the EU from 2011 to 2015. These sanctions 
encompassed a wide spectrum of restrictive 
measures in order to hinder Iranian nuclear 
aspirations by slowing down its supply of 
strategic materials, cutting the financial 
resources for its nuclear activities, particularly 
in trade and banking sectors, and banning 
entry to all persons related to the development 
of nuclear activities.  
It is acknowledged that „sanctions tend to 
succeed most in the initial years of 
implementation‟ and IMF data7 reveal that US 
and EU autonomous sanctions were decisive 
in the very first years of their implementation. 
However, the economic sanctions imposed in 
2012 also „led to a sharp contraction in 
economic activity, as well as higher inflation 
and unemployment‟ according to the 
International Monetary Fund‟s Staff Report for 
the 2015 Article IV Consultation with Iran, 
issued on 18 November 2015. It adds that 
„Much of the contraction in the economy was 
due to sharp drops in oil production and non-
oil productivity‟. This economic contraction, 
mainly due to economic sanctions, was one of 
the main causes of the Iranian return to the 
negotiating table when inflation and 
unemployment were likely to create severe 
social tensions that could threaten the Iranian 
political regime in the long term. 
 
US and EU economic sanctions may be 
considered to have exacerbated the flaws of a 
negative socioeconomic conditions8 in Iran 
that intensified under President Ahmadinejad‟s 
terms in office from 2006 to 2013. There are 
various criteria for assessing the sanctions‟ role 
and efficacy in the 12-year negotiating process. 
However, they may also be generally assessed 
by their capacity9 to favour the creation of 
common ground between E3+3 and Iran‟s 
interests, which resulted in Iran making 
concessions.  
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By the end of nine years of UN, US and EU 
sanctions, Iran had lowered its demands and 
intransigence in order to obtain a lifting of 
sanctions from the E3+3. Indeed, UN, US and 
EU economic sanctions may be considered 
effective given the severe economic damage 
inflicted on key sectors of the Iranian domestic 
economy, thus slowing down its funding of 
nuclear activities. However, these sanctions may 
be considered as less effective in slowing the 
supply of nuclear material to Iran, as between 
2003 and 2015 the country‟s centrifuges 
increased10 from 160 to 20,000. Iran was 
supplied with nuclear material through parallel 
circuits that did not require finances provided by 
the key economic sectors targeted by the 
sanctions. 
The conjunction of international economic 
sanctions and domestic economic 
mismanagement as well as the budgetary 
constraints within Iran caused by a sharp 
decrease in oil prices combined with „sharp 
drops in oil production and non-oil 
productivity,‟ led to a changing Iranian approach 
to E3+3. This was translated into the election of 
President Mohammad Rouhani in 2013 and led 
Iran to accept an agreement.  
 
 
 
FACTOR 4: THE SHARP ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY OF IRAN AFTER THE 
LIFTING OF EU AND US SANCTIONS 
COULD REINFORCE ITS REGIONAL 
IMPERIAL AMBITION. 
The fourth factor lies in the stakes and 
challenges resulting from the lifting of UN, US 
and EU economic sanctions. Iran demanded 
the lifting of the United States‟ and EU‟s 
restrictive measures on the first 
implementation date of the deal as these had 
particularly hard hit the Iranian domestic 
economy. The lifting of sanctions is 
conditional on the effective implementation of 
the deal by Iranian authorities. The lifting of 
sanctions will allow Iran to record new 
financial revenue in hydrocarbon sectors. 
Despite the „snap-back‟ penalties imposed by 
the JCPOA and the restrictions required by the 
AIEA, there is a risk that this money could be 
used to fund the acquisition of new nuclear 
materials and to develop a nuclear programme 
for weapons purposes. The E3+3 must remain 
vigilant regarding this key point.  
The European Parliamentary Research 
Service11 is stressing that „Israel and Saudi 
Arabia have also expressed concerns about 
Iran's increasing appetite for hegemony in the 
region, even though analysts see the agreement 
is an opportunity for more constructive 
engagement with Iran on some of the most 
burning security challenges, including in Syria, 
Iraq and Yemen.‟ 
„The rise in power of Iran that, by creating a 
nuclear sanctuary, seeks to achieve a more 
important role in the Middle East, is motivated 
by considerations of religion and the choice of 
civilisation, but also by a powerful desire to 
play a greater role on the geostrategic stage of 
fossil fuel resources to offset an exponential 
increase in its population.‟12 
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FACTOR 5: US DEMOCRATS AND 
REPUBLICANS STRUGGLE OVER THE 
NUCLEAR DEAL. 
„According to a September 2015 Pew Research 
survey, 49 percent of Americans disapproved of 
the nuclear deal, while 21 percent approved. 
Additionally, the survey found that 42 percent of 
Americans had “no confidence at all” that 
Iranian leaders will adhere to their obligations 
outlined in the deal, while only two percent had 
“a great deal of confidence” that leaders will.‟13 
If former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is 
elected as president in November 2016, a 
relatively stable foreign-policy scenario will 
result. However, the election of Republican 
presidential frontrunner Donald Trump would 
lead to the end of the nuclear deal with Iran. 
Trump has said he would „dismantle‟ the 
„disastrous‟ nuclear deal with Iran.  
„Speaking at the Brookings Institution on 
September 9, 2015, about the Iran nuclear deal, 
Hillary Clinton said, “As president I will take 
whatever actions are necessary to protect the US 
and its allies. I will not hesitate to take military 
action.” She also noted she understood Israel‟s 
concerns about the agreement, but added, “I 
would not support this agreement for one 
second if I thought it put Israel in greater 
danger.” Clinton emphasized that her approach 
to enforcement would be “distrust and verify.” 
Clinton defended the Iran nuclear deal on 
August 10, 2015, noting it was the joint effort of 
several nations and the United States‟ reputation 
would be harmed if the deal were rejected. “The 
Europeans, the Russians, the Chinese, they‟re 
going to say, „We stuck with the Americans. We 
agreed with the Americans. We hammered out 
this agreement. I guess their president can‟t 
make foreign policy.‟ That‟s a very bad signal to 
send in a quickly moving and oftentimes 
dangerous world,” Clinton said.‟14 
After the Iran nuclear deal was finalized on 14 
July 2015, Clinton said, „Based on what I know 
now, and I will be being briefed as soon as I 
finish addressing you, this is an important step 
for putting a lid on Iran‟s nuclear program.‟ 
Clinton cautioned that the deal must „be 
enforced vigorously, relentlessly.‟ 
Republican frontrunner Trump stated in April 
2016, however, that „My number one priority is 
to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran. I have 
been in business a long time. I know deal-
making and let me tell you, this deal is 
catastrophic – for America, for Israel, and for 
the Middle East.‟ He went on to say in an 
address to the annual conference of the 
American Israeli Political Action Committee 
(AIPAC): „The problem here is fundamental. We 
have rewarded the world‟s leading state sponsor 
of terror with $150 billion and we received 
absolutely nothing in return.‟. Alleging that the 
recent nuclear deal with Iran doesn‟t even 
require Iran to dismantle its military nuclear 
capability, Trump said it placed limits on Iran‟s 
military nuclear programme for only a certain 
number of years. „But when those restrictions 
expire, Iran will have an industrial-size military 
nuclear capability ready to go, and with zero 
provision for delay no matter how bad Iran‟s 
behaviour is, he said. […] The deal is silent on 
missile tests but those tests do violate UN 
Security Council Resolutions and no one has 
done anything about it, he said as he slammed 
the UN.‟15  
Trump went on to say, „First, we will stand up to 
Iran‟s aggressive push to destabilise and 
dominate the region. Iran is a very big problem 
and will continue to be, but if I‟m elected 
president, I know how to deal with trouble. 
Secondly, we will totally dismantle Iran‟s global 
terror network. Iran has seeded terror groups all 
over the world. Third, at the very least, we must 
hold Iran accountable by restructuring the terms 
of the previous deal.‟ Laying out his vision of 
US–Israeli relationship, he said that as American 
president, he would work to destroy Iran‟s 
alleged global terrorist network and prevent it 
from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
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CONCLUSION 
The E3+3 must remain vigilant concerning 
Iran‟s strict compliance with its obligations 
under the nuclear deal agreed with the E3+3 and 
P5+1. It will have the help of the inspection 
force of the IAEA in this. In addition to this 
vigilance, the E3+3, composed of the five 
nuclear powers and Germany, should be ready 
to keep Iran in strict compliance through 
diplomatic dialogue and coercion with a view to 
preventing the escalation of any crisis that might 
lead to a nuclear incident.  
Any discrepancy or breach of compliance would 
open a vacuum that the Iranian conservative 
wing will fill. The United States, where Secretary 
of State Clinton is currently likely to be elected 
as president, would retaliate by cancelling the 
deal on their part in case of any breach in 
compliance by Iran with its obligations under 
the concluded deal. 
Astrid Viaud is working on a doctorate in 
political sciences on ‘the policy of sanctions 
of the European Union vis-à-vis that of the 
United Nations: the case of Iran, Syria and 
Ukraine’ under the direction of Professor 
Tanguy de Wilde, professor of geopolitics 
and international relations at the Catholic 
University of Louvain. 
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